Blockchain MEV minimisation solution with price guarantee reward
Blockchain systems rely on miners to produce blocks, who solely build blocks for their financial benefit. Within the competitive market system, only correct blocks get accepted, which ensures security of the network. As financial applications migrate into the blockchain, miners in this privileged position have identified ways to extract additional revenues (known as MEV) that affect users and the overall security of the system. A possible direction for current research to resolve this exploitation is to separate the sequencing (building) and execution (mining/proposing) of transactions (PBS model). However, a weaker point of this model is the trust assumption between participants and the incentive model. This paper proposes a concept of separate incentive schemes for the work various participants conduct in their own interests.
Email Address of Submitting Authorbabu.email@example.com
ORCID of Submitting Author0000-0003-4675-154X
Submitting Author's InstitutionSouthern Cross University
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