Abstract
To make accurate inferences in an interactive setting, an agent must not
confuse passive observation of events with having participated in
causing those events. The “do” operator formalises interventions so
that we may reason about their effect. Yet there exist at least two
pareto optimal mathematical formalisms of general intelligence in an
interactive setting which, presupposing no explicit representation of
intervention, make maximally accurate inferences. We examine one such
formalism. We show that in the absence of an operator, an intervention
can still be represented by a variable. Furthermore, the need to
explicitly represent interventions in advance arises only because we
presuppose abstractions. The aforementioned formalism avoids this and
so, initial conditions permitting, representations of relevant causal
interventions will emerge through induction. These emergent abstractions
function as representations of one’s self and of any other object,
inasmuch as the interventions of those objects impact the satisfaction
of goals. We argue (with reference to theory of mind) that this explains
how one might reason about one’s own identity and intent, those of
others, of one’s own as perceived by others and so on. In a narrow sense
this describes what it is to be aware, and is a mechanistic explanation
of aspects of consciousness.