loading page

Detection of deception attacks in cyber physical systems using signal shaping Part II - Auxiliary system and process input feedback extensions
  • Chris Louen ,
  • Steven Ding
Chris Louen
\u200bUniversity Duisburg-Essen

Corresponding Author:[email protected]

Author Profile
Steven Ding
Author Profile


Improvements in efficiency and flexibility in industry are leading to an increasing number of networked control systems. However, the network communication also arises new security issues. In particular, stealthy integrity attacks can cause costs and even safety issues including personal injuries. The so-called deception attacks are designed with the aim of not being detected by (classical) detection systems. Numerous methods are developed to address the detection of attacks in networked control systems. Often the transmitted signals are preprocessed with additional time variant elements (e.g. permutation matrix). Usually, the usage of an attack detection system can easily recognised, which give the attacker the opportunity to prepare a more complex attack. This work presents a combination of measures to achieve protection of confidentiality and detect all commonly considered deception attacks in two parts. The basic attack detection scheme for cyber physical systems was presented in part one. The scheme consists of an additive and multiplicative sensor coding. In the second part, two extension are realised to improve the protection and enable the scheme to detect all in the literature often considered deception attacks (linear man-in-the-middle, replay, covert and zero dynamics). The first extension add a auxiliary system, which is integrated in a novel way. Second extension is a process input feedback to improve detection of attacks which have the process input as target. The efficiency of the proposed extensions is illustrated by numerical examples of detecting the aforementioned attacks.